Central European Pragmatist Forum 2026
Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University
Culture and Nature: Dewey’s Late Cultural Turn in an Unmodern World
I will examine the relative success of Dewey’s late cultural turn, eventual leading to such triumphs as “The Cultural Matrix of Inquiry” (from Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 1938), Freedom and Culture (1939), and most importantly, Unmodern and Modern Philosophy (1948), along with correspondence and other sources (including the unfinished Introduction in 1949 to the edition of Experience and Nature being edited by Joseph Ratner (LW 1:329–361), which is really the final word of the destiny of Experience and Nature. But my purpose is not mainly historical, even though this essay is mainly that. Ultimately, I want to assess the prospects for a Deweyan philosophy of culture and appraise its capacity to contribute to our needs in the present and for the future, with particular attention to the future of education. That appraisal will await a future study, but this essay lays the groundwork and suggests some paths for the greater purpose.
Arshak Balayan, American University of Armenia
The Democratic Promise of Evidence-Based Policymaking
Part 1 of this paper analyzes democracy’s knowledge problem and possible solutions to it. The knowledge problem arises because, under democracy, fundamental power belongs to the people. However, laypersons often lack the necessary knowledge to address the complex problems democracies face today (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1989). In practice democracies divide epistemic labor among citizens and delegate the task of solving complex social, economic, technological etc. problems to experts who are expected to use the best available theories and evidence. Part 2 develops this idea, showing how evidence-based policymaking (EBP) can address at least some of the democratic concerns raised by heavy reliance on expert advice. This is achieved in two steps. First, the paper emphasizes that individual autonomy and political equality – two values frequently invoked in arguments against over-reliance on expert advice must be balanced against other values such as individual well-being. Ensuring individual autonomy and political equality has opportunity costs. Suboptimal use of available (unequally distributed) knowledge leads to underuse of resources (natural, technological etc.) which imposes costs on people. To best serve the people, especially those least well off, societies must use all resources efficiently and distribute them equitably. Bearing in mind epistemic limitations of public deliberation mentioned above, it seems that both goals require responsible utilization of expert knowledge. Second, in Part 3 the paper develops a particular model of democratic EBP and shows how despite appearance of threatening democracy, EBP can actually mitigate concerns about undue expert influence. Naturally, specific aspects of EBP implemented in a given country must take into account a country’s economic, social, and political realities. In Part 4, the last section of the paper, some objections to the presented model of democratic EBP are discussed.
Amrita Banerjee, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
A Caring Techno-Pragmatism: Moral Imagination at the Nexus between Nature and Technology
The paper aims to develop a normative conception of the environment as a relational, mediated and imaginatively grounded space between self and human/non-human others. Through considering work in feminist utopia by two early twentieth century women thinkers across continents, namely, Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, I interpret their projects as a normative call to attend to corporeality, relational vulnerability, and moral dispossession (Banerjee 2025) in the process of re-signifying the idea of environment. I argue that the environment is conceived in a dual mode: as an outcome of collective moral imagination, and as the backdrop for exercising the powers of moral imagination. Such a conception of the environment calls for a strong ethics of space-making, central to which is moving beyond a binary understanding of the natural and the technological. A caring conception of technology is, therefore, crucial to this ethics of space-making. The analysis ultimately contributes to the development of a caring techno-pragmatism as an ethical paradigm to conceive of the nexus between nature and technology.
Kristina Bosáková, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University
Philipp Dorstewitz, American University of Ras Al Khaimah
The Irony of Destiny in the Light Fog of Reality
Emil Višňovský and John Ryder are not only the long-time colleagues and the founders of the Central European Pragmatist Forum, but they are also both active philosophers apparently on two different poles of Pragmatism. Meanwhile the pragmatist naturalism of John Ryder has been widely commented especially in the last years and even by Emil Višňovský himself, for example in the special issue of Pragmatism Today in 2021, Visnovsky’s humanism based on the neo-pragmatist philosophy has not been an object of profound analysis yet. However, the aim of this paper, is not to comment on Višňovský alone, but to find the philosophical overlaps and tensions, between Ryder´s pragmatist naturalism and Visnovsky’s pragmatist humanism. As both philosophers seem to build their anthropologically shaped theories upon the concepts of humanism, democracy, action and practice, we would like to investigate these categories further and show where their statements more or less significantly over or differ.
Matthew Brown, Southern Illinois University, Dewey Center
The Concept of “Situation” in John Dewey’s Logic of Inquiry
Central to John Dewey’s logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science is his theory of inquiry; central to how Dewey understands inquiry is his concept of a “situation”. This concept has proved a source of several interpretive puzzles and disagreements concerning the nature, boundaries, and individuation of situations, as well as how their transformation by inquiry works. In this paper, I provide a new reading of Dewey’s concept of “situation” that attempts to resolve the outstanding interpretive puzzles. Situations are centered on and individuated according to our practices and activities; they are bounded by whatever is relevant to said practices and activities. This criterion of relevance is both interest-relative (determined by the characteristic aims of the practices or activities that define the situation) and objective (determined by what, in fact, bears on the aims and interests of those practices and activities). A useful analogy can be drawn here with the concept of “environment” or “niche” in Gibson’s ecological psychology. Situations have qualitative characters that are immediately felt by the actors within them, but those qualities do not provide any form of epistemic foundations. An improved understanding of Dewey’s concept of the situation allows us to better understand the nature of Dewey’s contextualism: inquiry is situated in the context of a practice and directed at alleviating tensions within that practice. The success of inquiry is determined by the actual (objective) resolution of the tensions, but the scope of that success is bound by the situation and dependent on the characteristic aims and interests of a practice. This is one possible meaning of the somewhat obscure label of “objective relativism” sometimes applied to Dewey’s philosophy, though I prefer to call it simply “situationism”.
Lyubov Bugaeva, St. Petersburg University
Moral Deliberation and Its Environing Conditions
If we view moral deliberation as a series of simulations guided by diverse values, principles, conceptions of the ideal way of life, then each principle essentially represents a strategy for prioritizing a single value over other potential values that could be relevant in a particular situation. The simulation demonstrates how life could evolve if that principle or value were given precedence, and therefore serves as an enactment of the potential for reconfiguring our current experience. I see moral deliberation as a kind of “cognitive artifact” that creates a hypothetical scenario to trace and assess the outcomes of prioritizing a specific value in moral deliberation (for example, not to kill). In addressing the post-apocalyptic Apple TV series Pluribus (2025), I will delve into the concept of moral deliberation in the film’s simulations, which function as dramatic rehearsals. I will examine the relevance of those simulations for shaping the viewer’s moral judgement.
James Campbell, Emeritus, University of Toledo
Emerson’s Nature in its Pragmatist Environment
This paper is an examination of Emerson’s 1836 volume, Nature, that emphasizes the Pragmatic elements that underlie this Transcendentalist masterpiece. After some preliminary remarks, it considers the four uses that Emerson assigns to nature: commodity, beauty, discipline, and language. Then it focuses on his version of Idealism, with an emphasis on the possibilities of idealistic thinking rather than on metaphysical dualism. The examination of his Spirit chapter considers his dualistic approach to the inadequacies of materialism. In his consideration of Prospects, Emerson stresses the necessity for intuition to help us with the problems introduced by the narrowness of science, and the solution that is to be found in idealistic insight. This paper concludes with a discussion of Emerson’s overall faith in the possibilities of human flourishing.
Ľubomír Dunaj, Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Pragmatic Critical Theory and Chinese Philosophy: Cosmopolitanism and/vs/or Tianxia
The recent increase of various crises across the planet has become an acute concern for contemporary concepts of global ethics, because they call for a re-evaluation of the justification of existing frameworks and rules governing global processes. If they are to be both legitimate and effective, however, these regulations and rules cannot simply reflect the interests and dictates of Western powers, but should be the result of a genuine intercultural dialogue. In such a global dialogue, the position of China is especially important given its rising status as a major global player, therefore an adequate understanding of the philosophical, historical and cultural background informing current Chinese policy and ethical thought is essential. The aim of this talk is to compare selected conceptions of Chinese political and moral philosophy – from mainland China as well as outside of it to current Critical Theory debates, focusing on:
1) the cross-cultural gap and deficiency in philosophical explorations in Europe by confronting non-Western, especially contemporary Chinese philosophical approaches.
2) grounding methodologically the philosophical foundations of intercultural critical hermeneutics, focusing on the Western concept(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the East-Asian concept(s) of Tianxia.
3) showing the ethical and normative consequences arising of a critical-hermeneutical encounter with non-Western philosophical traditions for the mutually beneficial and respectful understanding in global political thought.
Nóra Horváth, Széchenyi István University
Utility vs. Futility – The Educational Environment or American Aesthetics at the End of the 19th Century
Are our young men being educated for the work of the twentieth century or of the seventeenth? (Charles Eliot). Twenty years after the Civil War, the classical sciences came under increasingly powerful attacks. Chemists – such as Josiah Cooke from Harvard – and industrial magnates, like Charles Francis Adams, president of the Union Pacific Railroad, and Andrew Carnegie, questioned whether a knowledge of the ancient world could have any utility in modern life. Since the survival of American universities depended on donations from industrial magnates, the majority of these institutions implemented changes. However, the events in America were, to the greatest extent, driven by precedents in England. For many years, I have been researching the oeuvres of artists and philosophers associated with Harvard University (such as George Santayana, Fred Holland Day, and Edward Perry Warren) who, drawing upon Platonic philosophy and adopting the teachings and principles of emerging European artistic and philosophical movements, brought a new dimension to the development of American culture. The lifelong work of all three is subordinated to an ideal defined by Heavenly Eros, and their relationship with the world is fundamentally grounded in aesthetics. In my presentation, I aim to demonstrate how the educational reforms that took place in England and the United States during the 19th century influenced researchers and artists who possessed a particular affinity for antiquity.
Andrea Javorská, Slovak Philosophical Association / Pavol Jozef Šafárik University
The Philosophical Pragmatism of Emil Višňovský
The lecture will present several fundamental pillars of the philosophical thought of Professor Emil Višňovský, who introduced the philosophy of pragmatism into the intellectual environment of Slovakia and critically developed it further. The first dimension reflects on the problem of metaphilosophy, particularly through of Emil Višňovský interpretation of the key moments of Richard Rorty’s philosophy, his effort to understand philosophy, as well as its meaning and prospects. The second dimension reveals selected questions concerning the philosophy of institutions, their nature, identity, and organization. It reassesses traditional approaches to the phenomenon of community and to the structural tension between being together and being opposed to one another. I refine the broader interpretive framework through Višňovský’s effort to understand human life in its creativity, dynamism, and care for it.
Julian Tobias Klar, Ruprecht-Karls-University of Heidelberg
Participatory Pluralism – A Political Philosophy Inspired by Hannah Arendt and John Dewey in Response to Democracy’s Jeopardy
In my talk, I reconstruct the background assumptions of my proposed political theory termed Participatory Pluralism based on the political thought of both Hannah Arendt and John Dewey and I specify and argue in favor of the details of my suggested political philosophy, contextualizing the scope of my reconstruction of Arendt’s and Dewey’s thought within different thematic areas of their political theories. Then, I detail my own scholarly contribution by proposing four mid-level political principles meant to guide democratic political practice, suggesting these as the ‘antidote’ to what I call the Four Harbingers of Democracy’s Eclipse: The eclipse of the public, the suppression of plurality, the substitution of administration for politics, and the collapse of worldly judgement, the four responding principles being: public formation, plural appearance, democratic inquiry, and the resilient worldly judgement.
Armen Marsoobian, Southern Connecticut State University
Can Democracy Survive the Loss of Trust in Scientific Expertise? Some Reflections from the Pragmatist Tradition
The more than a decades-long attack against scientific expertise, whether in the form of climate change denial or vaccine skepticism, reflects a serious loss of trust in social institutions fundamental to democracy. Reflecting on the works of such pragmatists as John Dewey, Philip Kitcher, and Steven Fesmire, I identify causes and proposed solutions. An important element evidenced in these writings is the shortcomings of our educational system. Our overemphasis on workforce enhancement at the expense of arts and humanities education has accelerated the dangerous shortcomings of critical thinking skills essential for an informed citizenry in a social democratic society.
Lee McBride, College of Wooster
Democratic Ideals (and the Attending Impediments)
W.E.B. Du Bois articulates a conception of democracy that is closely linked with the creation of beauty. Democracy, here, is extended beyond the rule of the many, emphasizing the creation of beauty and meaning, the creation of culture. Democracy, thus, requires the training/education of the lowest caste of workers, racialized peoples, and those deemed “inherent subordinates” so that they have a realistic opportunity to participate in creation and maintenance of democracy. The channeling and nurturing of latent skill and ability should not be left to serendipity. Positive liberty is required. If we want better children, we must train them in Truth; offer them abundant opportunities to develop unknown talents and proclivities; prod them to develop as human beings, not simply as workers. Within a genuine democracy, all human beings – regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, and gender – should have a chance to contribute to the beauty of the world.
Leif Östman, Novia University of Applied Sciences
Sustainable World-Making – Rethinking Architectural Production and Culture under Algorithmic Conditions
This paper examines how AI-assisted design tools reshape architectural practice and strengthen the grand narrative that legitimizes it. As algorithmic systems promise efficiency and statistically optimized solutions, they reinforce a modernist ideal in which architectural production becomes a technical problem rather than a human, experiential, and democratic practice aiming at spaces for life. Drawing on John Dewey’s pragmatist conception of experience and democracy, together with phenomenological insights in architectural theory, the paper argues that such optimization obscures the qualitative and situated dimensions of world-making. When design is aligned too closely with economic rationalization and algorithmic prediction, the experiential richness of the built environment diminishes. The paper aims at a Deweyan reconstruction compiling arguments for sustaining distinctly human capacities in design: experiences of unique environments should be a shared condition of a meaningful and dignified life. A reconstructed foundation for architectural culture is proposed – one that integrates technology without surrendering the experiential and democratic foundations of social sustainability.
Trevor Pearce, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Biology Hesitant: W. E. B. Du Bois, Evolutionary Sociology, and Pragmatism
In Pragmatism’s Evolution (2020), I argued that W. E. B. Du Bois – like John Dewey, Jane Addams, and George Herbert Mead – was influenced by Herbert Spencer’s philosophy and developed an experimental-evolutionary approach to social reform. Du Bois thus frequently deployed biological concepts in his work from 1897 to 1903. But in 1904 and 1905, Du Bois began to criticize Spencer’s evolutionary sociology. What changed? Looking back on this period four decades later, Du Bois wrote the following: “I fell back upon my [Josiah] Royce and [William] James and deserted [Gustav] Schmoller and [Max] Weber.” He even described his view as “Jamesian pragmatism, applied not simply to ethics, but to all human action.” In this paper, I will examine the views of Du Bois’s teachers – James at Harvard University and Schmoller at the University of Berlin – in an attempt to understand what Du Bois might have meant by this comment. Using Du Bois’s own notes from his courses with Schmoller and James, I will suggest that although he began his career in sociology emphasizing a Schmollerian world that “exhibits chance and arbitrariness nowhere and sufficient causes everywhere,” what he learned from James helped him to reimagine the role of chance, human effort, and self-determination in social and racial progress.
Zachary Piso, University of Dayton
Values in (social) science (context): What it means to explain in terms of traditional ecological knowledge and sense of place
Social-ecological systems science explains environmental change by citing social causes, and environmental pragmatism can illuminate the stakes of explanations that key on different causes. This book chapter investigates how the vocabularies that we deploy in describing and explaining our social practices carries with it practical implications for how we should manage social-ecological systems. A quick primer on debates about values in science is followed by a more careful review of Helen Longino’s Studying Human Behavior, which motivates a critical contextualist account of how theories of human behavior should be evaluated in terms of how they ground interventions that support social aims. I then apply this account in the evaluation of two paradigmatic approaches in social-ecological systems – explaining in terms of traditional ecological knowledge and in terms of sense of place – to dramatically rehearse how a community could arrive at a “legitimate explanation” for why we do what we do.
Scott Pratt, University of Oregon
Intolerant Democracy
In a time of rising autocracies and the apparent abandonment of constitutional democracy by the United States, many are looking for remedies. Many of these remedies quickly run into what can be called the democratic paradox. To be a democracy is to be inclusive, including even those who openly oppose democracy. Suppress this element of the democratic society and the society is no longer democratic. One response to the paradox is the concept of militant democracy, first developed in the 1930s. I will argue for an alternative response – intolerant democracy – that is framed by Horace Kallen’s conceptions of democracy and freedom. While militant democracy is an institutional response to the paradox, intolerant democracy is an aesthetic response developed by Kallen using John Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience. Kallen’s answer to the democratic paradox opens the way for democratic resistance grounded in local, situated experience that responds to the “anesthetic” central to both authoritarianism and liberalism. Such resistance is not dictated by prior fixed principles but is emergent founded on improvisation in relation to collectively imagined futures.
Štěpán Raška, Charles University
How to Normatively Orient in (Un)Democratic Practice? Peirce and Habermas
In my presentation, I will examine Jürgen Habermas’s reception of Charles Sanders Peirce. While Peirce emphasizes epistemic success – truth within the scientific community – Habermas focuses on acceptability in discourse, understood as validity and justifiability within institutional deliberation. Despite these differences, I argue that a productive connection emerges when considered through the regulative function of ideas: Peirce’s notions of reality and the ideal community, and Habermas’s concept of the ideal normative horizon, serve as regulative orientations toward epistemic and normative improvement. In this sense, Habermas’s and Peirce’s frameworks share a structural motif: agents orient their practices toward greater coherence, adequacy, or mutual intelligibility under idealized conditions. Against this backdrop, I show how Peirce’s pragmatism informs Habermas’s democratic theory, revealing the practical role of ideals in structuring democratic-critical interaction.
John Ryder, Independent Scholar
Life in the Subjunctive
Much of recent and contemporary philosophy, presumably taking its cue from the sciences and mathematics, approaches inquiry as if its purpose were to establish what is the case with respect to whatever it is studying. While this may be fruitful in many contexts, it is debilitating in any philosophical effort to understand human being and experience. The reason it is debilitating is that our lives are lived not only in the context of what is the case, which is to say of the indicative, but also and importantly in the subjunctive. Much of what is most important in our lives reflects and embodies the conditional, the counterfactual, the possible, the normative, and the absent. To avoid doing damage to our understanding of human experience our philosophical categories and forms of inquiry need to be sufficiently broad, varied, and flexible to accommodate the pervasiveness of the subjunctive in human life and the experiential richness it enables.
Radim Šip, Tomas Bata University in Zlín / Charles University
Building a Home: Pragmatism, Responsibility, and Metaphysical Guilt
This paper develops Emil Višňovský’s metaphors of home and garden as a pragmatist framework for understanding responsibility in contemporary democratic societies. Drawing on Višňovský, John Dewey, Bruno Latour, Hans Jonas, and Karl Jaspers, it argues that home should be understood not as a fixed place or identity but as a dynamic field of transactions continuously shaped by human action. The paper interprets home as a network of relationships and consequences sustained through care and collective responsibility. Building on Dewey’s concept of indirect consequences, it shows how shared life gives rise to publics, commons, and forms of democratic coordination. Because contemporary consequences increasingly transcend political borders and generations, responsibility must also be understood in transnational and transgenerational terms. The argument culminates in Jaspers’ concept of metaphysical guilt, understood as responsibility arising from participation in a shared world.
Jane Skinner, Cape Peninsula University of Technology
The Fractured Pragmatist Environment: In Defense of a Margolisian ‘Robust Relativism’
This paper argues that there appear to be several differing options currently available to us as representing our current pragmatist environment – each seeking grounds for legitimate political advocacy. For the purposes of this paper, I will discuss three principal approaches as represented by different leading pragmatist thinkers, viz: Scott Pratt’s ‘absolute pragmatism’; John Ryder’s soft relativism (‘On common Interests’) and Joseph Margolis’s ‘robust relativism’. I argue that the complex divergent idea of an ‘absolute pragmatism’ as presented by Pratt (following Royce) could be shown to be an unnecessary move within a pragmatist approach where a Margolian/Peircean understanding is accepted; that Ryder’s ‘common interests’ lose traction on any specific political action, while at the same time undermining democracy as a central tenet of Pragmatism. I conclude that only a ‘robust relativism’, supported by Margolis’s interpretation of Peirce’s ‘abductive truth’, can make political action both feasible and defensible within a coherent concept of what can be generally recognized as a pragmatist philosophical environment. I examine each of these options through the triple lens of its inherent logic; its historical links to earlier pragmatisms; and its potential to underpin a political standpoint. I conclude that Margolis’s contribution to pragmatism has been consistently undervalued and that it should be reassessed as equaling, at least potentially, that of Peirce, James and Dewey.
Tess Varner, Concordia University
Magical Thinking: Pragmatist Visions for Positive Peace
We are living in one of the most complex geopolitical moments in decades. Nuclear, biological, technological and climate risks are dramatically worsening. Human rights are under attack from authoritarian regimes and global conflicts. International order appears to be unraveling, even as the US President claims to have ended six (or sometimes eight) wars. In such a context, the creation of conditions for peace and human flourishing feels futile at worst and, perhaps, naïve at best. The term “magical thinking” is sometimes used colloquially to refer to thinking that has no basis in reality and which allows the impossible to seem possible. In this paper, I ask whether or not notions of positive peace are simply flights of fancy and not meaningfully plausible. And, if they aren’t plausible, is it useful for us to continue engaging with these kinds of thinking? Feminist utopian and Afrofuturist thinkers contend that future visioning is absolutely critical, especially in moments when doing so appears the least fruitful. Bridging research in peace studies, including Johan Galtung and Elise Boulding, with pragmatist and feminist scholarship, I’ll argue in this paper for a kind of “magical thinking” that is largely absent from contemporary peace studies, but vital even as the prospect of positive peace appears less and less likely.
Emil Višňovský, Comenius University Bratislava
Pragmatist Humanism as a Key to Solving Environmental Problems
The doctrine of humanism seems to sit comfortably in pragmatism, in both of its classical and some contemporary versions. Even though Ch. S. Peirce famously had no explicit use for humanism and criticized both W. James and F. C. S. Schiller for making it a key feature of – or even a label for – pragmatism, for James, humanism was a type of philosophical thinking (equivalent to pluralism) with fully fledged epistemological, ontological and even theistic connotations, not merely normative ethical ones. John Dewey’s humanism is another weighty chapter, containing not only his theoretical thoughts, related especially to his educational mission, but also his social and public intellectual initiatives such as co-signing “Humanist Manifesto I” (1933). Later Dewey’s pragmatist humanism/humanist pragmatism was developed in the works of his most important student, Sidney Hook (1902–1989), and in turn by his students and other Deweyan followers, above all the neoclassical pragmatist Paul Kurtz (1925–2012). Rorty’s neopragmatist version of humanism encompasses aspects of classical and neoclassical pragmatist doctrines enriched by post-linguistic and Romantic strands. In this paper I have a double-ended objective: first to revisit the pragmatist conception of humanism and, second, based on this to argue that humanity cannot solve its environmental issues with its relations to terrestrial nature unless it can remake its “internal” issues within humanity, i. e. its relations of humans to humans in a humanistic way. I will try to sketch some points of this humanistic solution.
Chris Voparil, Lynn University
Harris, Rorty, and Communities of Insurrection
This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the nature and role of communities of insurrection and the problem of exclusion from the moral community. My main claim is that while pragmatism surely needs some measure of an insurrectionist ethos to realize its own goals for social change, pragmatist insights can enhance insurrectionism’s aims and methods. I offer a critical examination of Leonard Harris’s and Richard Rorty’s shared programs for expanding and reenvisioning moral communities to include the excluded and empower the devaluated. Both carve out a role for cultivating moral sensibilities to address exclusion from our moral community, recognize the limits of reason and moral argumentation in the face of exclusion and oppression, and call for new forms of rationality. Rorty’s skepticism about appeals to moral argument to remedy injustice and dehumanization, I suggest, softens the opposition of moral suasion and insurrectionism, while pointing to pragmatist commitments in Harris’s own thinking.
Sandra Zákutná, University of Prešov
From “What is the Human Being?” to Pragmatist Humanism
The article connects Kant’s practical philosophy – centered on his fourth question, “What is the human being?” and his understanding of humanity – with pragmatism, focusing on Richard Rorty and Emil Višňovský’s reading of Rorty as a humanist thinker. Drawing on Višňovský’s interpretation, the article examines Rorty’s project of “humanizing humanity” (Višňovský 2020) as a form of pragmatist humanism and as a way of rethinking the Enlightenment through the question of what it means to be human.
Štefan Zolcer, Comenius University Bratislava
Whitehead and Pragmatism on the Nature of Science and Higher Education
In contemporary debates on science and higher education, we repeatedly encounter polarized positions such as those between canonists and anti‑canonists, and between the ideals of emancipation and obligation in education. This paper argues that classical pragmatism and Whitehead’s philosophy share crucial assumptions that make them especially relevant to current discussions about science and higher education. Despite important differences, both traditions offer ways of addressing many of today’s philosophical and educational problems, which often arise from one‑sidedness or from extreme positions on either side. They offer a shared conceptual framework that can mediate these conflicts without collapsing them into easy compromise or relativism. The importance of pragmatism lies in its approach to science, philosophy, and education. Drawing on John Dewey’s conception of inquiry and education, as interpreted by George Allan and Emil Višňovský, I first show how the principles that govern science, philosophy, and education are fundamentally the same as the principles that govern life itself. By bringing Deweyan pragmatism and Whitehead’s process philosophy into dialogue, the paper argues that this shared view of the continuity between life, science, and education provides a fruitful framework for overcoming rigid dualisms and for rethinking the aims and practices of contemporary higher education.